I'm an Atheist, so as you might expect, I strongly disagree with your piece.
I dispute the consequences of atheism you discuss in the piece, but let's grant them for the sake argument. This doesn't make God's existence any more true...
I think there’s a slight misunderstanding here, and it’s important enough to clarify.
The argument I’m making is not “atheism leads to X, therefore God exists.” I’m not arguing for God’s existence at all, nor am I appealing to any particular theological definition. The point is structural, not doctrinal.
My claim is simply that philosophy is not consequence free. The universe can be described as the set of all that exists, and any axioms, rules, or constraints we adopt about that set necessarily affect how we treat entities within it. That’s not theology, that’s logic and mathematics. If you alter first principles, you alter downstream outcomes. Some entities gain protection whereas others lose it. That part is unavoidable.
The essay is critiquing the idea that we can treat foundational questions about truth, value, and normativity as if they are optional, aesthetic, or purely expressive, without those choices cashing out in real exclusions and harms. Whether one is a theist or an atheist is secondary to that point.
When I refer to an “objective ground,” I’m talking about the necessity of non arbitrary constraint at first principles for coherence, justice, and reasoning to be more than enforced consensus. You can reject theological language entirely and still face that problem. Denying such a ground doesn’t make consequences disappear, it just relocates authority to consensus, power, or preference where that reality still remains.
So the disagreement here isn’t really about atheism versus theism. It’s about whether value, truth, and dignity are discovered constraints or constructed arrangements, and whether philosophy should be treated as harmless play when its assumptions are literally applied to human lives.
"So the disagreement here isn’t really about atheism versus theism." you're right, but why include theism if it is not necessary. This is a tangent but I have an issue with Theists saying "Well, atheism leads to such and such", because this is irrelevant. Atheism could lead to mass suicide and the fall of mankind, it wouldn't make any less true (in the sense that it would have no bearing on its veracity). This wasn't your argument, so let's move on.
"It’s about whether value, truth, and dignity are discovered constraints or constructed arrangements, and whether philosophy should be treated as harmless play when its assumptions are literally applied to human lives."
Got it, reading the piece through this lens makes much more sense. I would say we discover that most of us naturally construct these arrangements.
"Because what happens when society changes its mind? When what was once “valuable” becomes inconvenient? When a different group “chooses” new values? History has already answered that question—with slavery, genocide, eugenics, colonialism, and erasure of the inconvenient"
Let's grant, for the sake of argument, that you are correct--making ethics non-objective leads to genocide and colonialism. Does that say anything on whether ethics are objective? I don't think so.
Thanks for taking the time to reread my essay, I appreciate that. I think the point where we’re talking past each other is when you say that even if non objective ethics leads to genocide or colonialism, that wouldn’t say anything about whether ethics are objectively grounded. I agree with you that bad consequences alone don’t determine truth. I’m not making a pragmatic or consequentialist argument. I’m not saying this led to atrocities, therefore it’s absolutely false.
The issue is about constraint, not outcomes.
In science, imagination is disciplined by reality. You can be creative in your models, but if you ignore gravity, load bearing limits, or material strength, the structure collapses. No one responds by saying that the bridge failing doesn’t prove physics is objective. The point is that physics binds whether we acknowledge it or not, and successful application presupposes that constraint.
In ethics, however, an inversion occurs. We want to protect rights, limit power, and ground dignity but treat the objective conditions that make such constraint possible as optional or imaginative. It’s like treating gravity as a preference rather than a fact. Ethical objectivity isn’t mystical or theological; it consists of the basic conditions that make moral reasoning intelligible at all, that reality is not arbitrary, that truth cannot contradict itself, that actions have consequences independent of opinion, and that persons exist with interests that cannot simply be overridden by agreement or authority.
When these constraints aren’t acknowledged, ethical systems can look coherent while remaining only structurally aesthetic rather than genuinely binding. They hold so long as no real weight is applied. Once what’s at stake is not theory but human lives and rights, the system fails, not because of a lack of empathy or consensus, but because it was never anchored to something that could actually bind.
That’s the difference from science. Ethics is rarely held to the same standard of objective constraint, because doing so would make power, elite or otherwise, answerable to reality rather than to preference. My claim isn’t that consequences prove objectivity, it’s that applicability presupposes constraint. If an ethical framework is meant to bear real moral weight, it has to be grounded in something that constrains us whether we agree with it or not.
I’m glad it was helpful, and I appreciate you engaging with it seriously. I’m familiar with constructivism, yes. My interest, however, is a broader issue, that even “constructed” normativity relies on preexisting constraints like coherence and non-arbitrariness to function at all. Those constraints aren’t constructed by the process, they’re what make the process intelligible. That’s the area of my focus.
I'm an Atheist, so as you might expect, I strongly disagree with your piece.
I dispute the consequences of atheism you discuss in the piece, but let's grant them for the sake argument. This doesn't make God's existence any more true...
I think there’s a slight misunderstanding here, and it’s important enough to clarify.
The argument I’m making is not “atheism leads to X, therefore God exists.” I’m not arguing for God’s existence at all, nor am I appealing to any particular theological definition. The point is structural, not doctrinal.
My claim is simply that philosophy is not consequence free. The universe can be described as the set of all that exists, and any axioms, rules, or constraints we adopt about that set necessarily affect how we treat entities within it. That’s not theology, that’s logic and mathematics. If you alter first principles, you alter downstream outcomes. Some entities gain protection whereas others lose it. That part is unavoidable.
The essay is critiquing the idea that we can treat foundational questions about truth, value, and normativity as if they are optional, aesthetic, or purely expressive, without those choices cashing out in real exclusions and harms. Whether one is a theist or an atheist is secondary to that point.
When I refer to an “objective ground,” I’m talking about the necessity of non arbitrary constraint at first principles for coherence, justice, and reasoning to be more than enforced consensus. You can reject theological language entirely and still face that problem. Denying such a ground doesn’t make consequences disappear, it just relocates authority to consensus, power, or preference where that reality still remains.
So the disagreement here isn’t really about atheism versus theism. It’s about whether value, truth, and dignity are discovered constraints or constructed arrangements, and whether philosophy should be treated as harmless play when its assumptions are literally applied to human lives.
Fantastic!
I had completely misread the piece; apologies!
"So the disagreement here isn’t really about atheism versus theism." you're right, but why include theism if it is not necessary. This is a tangent but I have an issue with Theists saying "Well, atheism leads to such and such", because this is irrelevant. Atheism could lead to mass suicide and the fall of mankind, it wouldn't make any less true (in the sense that it would have no bearing on its veracity). This wasn't your argument, so let's move on.
"It’s about whether value, truth, and dignity are discovered constraints or constructed arrangements, and whether philosophy should be treated as harmless play when its assumptions are literally applied to human lives."
Got it, reading the piece through this lens makes much more sense. I would say we discover that most of us naturally construct these arrangements.
"Because what happens when society changes its mind? When what was once “valuable” becomes inconvenient? When a different group “chooses” new values? History has already answered that question—with slavery, genocide, eugenics, colonialism, and erasure of the inconvenient"
Let's grant, for the sake of argument, that you are correct--making ethics non-objective leads to genocide and colonialism. Does that say anything on whether ethics are objective? I don't think so.
Nice piece though! Thanks for sharing it!
Thanks for taking the time to reread my essay, I appreciate that. I think the point where we’re talking past each other is when you say that even if non objective ethics leads to genocide or colonialism, that wouldn’t say anything about whether ethics are objectively grounded. I agree with you that bad consequences alone don’t determine truth. I’m not making a pragmatic or consequentialist argument. I’m not saying this led to atrocities, therefore it’s absolutely false.
The issue is about constraint, not outcomes.
In science, imagination is disciplined by reality. You can be creative in your models, but if you ignore gravity, load bearing limits, or material strength, the structure collapses. No one responds by saying that the bridge failing doesn’t prove physics is objective. The point is that physics binds whether we acknowledge it or not, and successful application presupposes that constraint.
In ethics, however, an inversion occurs. We want to protect rights, limit power, and ground dignity but treat the objective conditions that make such constraint possible as optional or imaginative. It’s like treating gravity as a preference rather than a fact. Ethical objectivity isn’t mystical or theological; it consists of the basic conditions that make moral reasoning intelligible at all, that reality is not arbitrary, that truth cannot contradict itself, that actions have consequences independent of opinion, and that persons exist with interests that cannot simply be overridden by agreement or authority.
When these constraints aren’t acknowledged, ethical systems can look coherent while remaining only structurally aesthetic rather than genuinely binding. They hold so long as no real weight is applied. Once what’s at stake is not theory but human lives and rights, the system fails, not because of a lack of empathy or consensus, but because it was never anchored to something that could actually bind.
That’s the difference from science. Ethics is rarely held to the same standard of objective constraint, because doing so would make power, elite or otherwise, answerable to reality rather than to preference. My claim isn’t that consequences prove objectivity, it’s that applicability presupposes constraint. If an ethical framework is meant to bear real moral weight, it has to be grounded in something that constrains us whether we agree with it or not.
This was extremely insightful, I greatly appreciate your patience.
I don't have much to add as of now, because I'll need to think on it.
Are you familiar with constructivism?
I’m glad it was helpful, and I appreciate you engaging with it seriously. I’m familiar with constructivism, yes. My interest, however, is a broader issue, that even “constructed” normativity relies on preexisting constraints like coherence and non-arbitrariness to function at all. Those constraints aren’t constructed by the process, they’re what make the process intelligible. That’s the area of my focus.